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LUNCHEON DEBATE:
CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. BECKER, MODERATOR,*
THEODORE OLSON* &

PHILIP CORBOY"
I. OPENING
THE HONORABLE EDWARD BECKER: This program confronts
the overarching question of whether the tort system is working and
whether it serves the search for truth. This Debate, entitled "Civil Justice
and the Plaintiff's Bar," should help to crystalize these issues. It will be
a real treat, I promise you, for we are fortunate to have as our presenters
two of America's very best lawyers, Ted Olson and Phil Corboy.
Our first speaker will be Ted Olson, a partner in the Washington
office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, who is unquestionably one of the
nation's premier appellate litigators. During the last term of the Supreme
Court, Mr. Olson argued three cases, which must be some kind of a
record for a lawyer in private practice. He argued the Stacy Koon case,'
now the leading case on review of departures under the sentencing
guidelines; the VMI case, 2 the male-only admissions policy case; and the
Gasperini case, 3 dealing with appellate review of jury verdicts for
excessiveness in diversity cases. These three cases represent only the tip
of the iceberg of Mr. Olson's appellate practice. His vita contains a
dazzling list of important cases, before the Supreme Court and other
appellate courts, of incredible breadth.
Mr. Olson is a graduate of the law school of Boalt Hall, Berkeley,
California. He served from 1981 to 1984 as the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, which made him the
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
** Attorney, Litigation Department of the Washington, D.C., office of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher. Mr. Olson is also the President of the Washington, D.C., Chapter
of the Lawyers Division of the Federalist Society and a member of the legal advisory
committees for the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, the Washington Legal
Foundation, and the Center for Individual Rights.
*** Founding partner of Corboy & Demetrio. Mr. Corboy has served as President
of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, as well as a
member of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates and Chairman of its
Section of Litigation.
1. See Koon v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (1996).
2. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
3. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2211 (1996).
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executive branch's principal legal adviser, with a major role in
formulating the branch's position on constitutional issues.
Ted Olson has also been a leader in the movement for tort reform.
The title of his essay in the January 1994 issue of the SMU Law Review

was, "The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice System. "4

I think it needs words like that to bring out the noted "shrinking

violet," the very shy Chicago lawyer who is our other luncheon speaker,
Phil Corboy. Mr. Corboy is one of America's most successful, most

colorful, and if you represent an insurance company or defendant, most
feared plaintiffs' trial lawyers.

Mr. Corboy is probably best known to the public for his role in

representing plaintiffs in the Tylenol5 and the Iowa DC-10 crash cases, 6
but his record of jury verdicts and out-of-court settlements is also
dazzling. He has been called by a leader of the Chicago bar, the ultimate
personal injury lawyer and the "best of the best" in his field. We really
have two of the "best of the best" in this debate today.

Mr. Corboy is a graduate of Loyola Law School, a former head of the
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association (ABA), and a former
president of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association. He has written countless articles in his field7 and is a leader
in the movement opposing tort reform.

4. See Theodore B. Olson, The ParasiticDestruction of America's Civil Justice
System, 47 SMU L. REv. 359 (1994).
5. The Tylenol litigation commenced in 1982, after seven people in the Chicago area
were killed after ingesting cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules. Johnson & Johnson settled
the lawsuits for an undisclosed amount in May 1991, on the day that jury selection was
set to begin for trial at Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois. Philip H. Corboy was cocounsel for the families of the victims. See Lourdes Lee Valeriano, Johnson & Johnson
Settles Suits Tied to Tylenol Deaths, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1991, at B6; Andrew Blum
& Randall Samborn, Tylenol Settlement Revives Secrecy War, NAT'L L.J., May 27,
1991, at 3.
6. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 631 N.E.2d 1302 (IU. App. Ct.
1994).
7. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, Cross-examination: Walking the Line Between
ProperPrejudiceand Unethical Conduct, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 1 (1986); Philip H.
Corboy & Susan J. Schwartz, Going the Distance:How to Perfect the Trial Record and
Win on Appeal, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1990, at 80; Philip Corboy, No: It's Already Covered,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 35; Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution:Rebuilding
Barriersto Jury Trial in the ProposedRestatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability,
61 TENN. L. REv. 1043 (1994); Philip H. Corboy, Vicarious Liability for Punitive
Damages: The Effort to Constitutionalize "Tort Reform," 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 5
(1991); Philip H. Corboy, "Reform" and Constitutional Change, LITIG., Fall 1993, at
22.
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II. MAIN ARGUMENTS

THEODORE OLSON: We are going to talk today about the
participation by lawyers, particularly plaintiffs' trial lawyers, in the
political process. I would like to give you some numbers. One study,
based on Federal Election Commission and state filings records, of trial
lawyer political contributions for candidates for state and local offices in
Texas, Alabama, and California-three hot-bed states for the tort
movement-showed $17.3 million in contributions by trial lawyers to state
and local candidates.' Ninety-five percent of the fund went to Democratic
candidates. 9 The study also estimates that $60 million in contributions
were made nationwide by plaintiffs' trial lawyers.' Compare that with
In fact, the plaintiffs' trial bar
$5 million from the AFL-CIO."
contributed to political candidates more than the five largest labor unions
Forbes magazine 3 referred to the plaintiffs' bar as
combined. 2
"America's third political party."'
The top ten federal Senate and House candidate recipients of trial
lawyer money were all Democrats. 4 Of the top fifteen contributing
lawyers to political candidates for Alabama state offices-and bear in mind
that in Alabama judges are political candidates-each contributed on
average $30,000 per year.' That is a lot of money per year. Within
those top fifteen contributors, for a five-year period in Alabama, the top
8. See Leslie Spencer, America's Third PoliticalParty?, FORBES, Oct. 24, 1994,
at 60.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASs'N, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES BY PLAINTIFFS' LAWYER INDUSTRY: 1989-1994, at 2

(1995) [hereinafter 1995 ATRA REPORT] (explaining that plaintiffs' lawyers contributed
$30,939,319 for federal races while the five largest labor unions (AFSCME, Teamsters,
United Auto Workers, National Education Association, AFL-CIO) in total contributed
$29,727,165).
13. See Spencer, supra note 8.
14. See 1995 ATRA REPORT, supra note 12, at 5 (listing all Democrats with the
exception of Republican Sen. Charles Tanksley of Georgia).
15. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASS'N, "AMERICA'S THIRD POLITICAL PARTY;"
A STUDY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER INDUSTRY 10

(1994) (listing the average contribution rate of $147,763 for a five year period).
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lawyer contributed $322,000 per year, 6 the fifteenth highest contributor
gave $36,000.11
In Texas, among the top fifteen contributors, the average lawyer
contribution to state candidates was $46,000 per year.' 8 In California,
the top contribution rate was $225,000 per year. 9 These are just for the
state candidates. The leader was William Lerach, who that year made
$800,000 in campaign contributions. 2 As I said, in many of these
states, the recipients of those political contributions are judges.
At the presidential level, the Washington Post reported earlier this
year that lawyers had made more contributions to President Clinton's
campaign fund than retired persons, business services, and the real estate
industry combined. 21 At that time, the lawyers had contributed forty
percent of the contributions received by the top ten contributing groups in
the re-election campaign for President Clinton.' 2
Now, I hasten to say that all of those contributions were not
necessarily from plaintiffs' trial lawyers, because the collectors of those
statistics did not differentiate between law firms on the defense side and
law firms on the plaintiffs' side; but, obviously, lawyers have a large role
in contributing to the political process.
In 1992, trial lawyers put out letters and fund-raising materials stating
that if you contribute to Clinton's campaign fund, there will be no tort
reform at the federal level, and if a law is passed by the House and
Senate, you can be assured that if you contribute to President Clinton, he
will veto such legislation. President Clinton delivered on that promise this
year and last year when he vetoed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act,' which was recommended and supported by the Chairman of his
16. See id. at 12.
17. See id.

18. See id. at 11 (listing the average contribution rate of $228,799 for a five year
period).

19. See id. at 13.
20. See id.
21. See Ruth Marcus, Study Traces Sources of RecordFund-Raising by Clinton and
Dole, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1996, at A9.

22. See id.
23. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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own party. However, the bill passed over his veto.24 President Clinton
also vetoed the product liability bill,25 which was not passed over his veto.
Some trial lawyer money, of course, does go to Republican
candidates. That is why it was impossible to get cloture, and it was
impossible to override the veto of the product liability bill.
Trial lawyers are the largest contributors to political campaigns in this
country, and they usually have one objective in mind. On the other hand,
other contributors to the campaign process commonly have multiple
objectives. For example, corporate money may be interested in bills that
have to do with the labor laws, environmental laws, or export controls and
things of that nature. A corporation or corporate executive who
participates in the political process has a wealth of issues on the table in
which they are interested and they may come back again and again for
different things; therefore, their influence is diluted. However, when trial
lawyers go to a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
that trial lawyer is able to say, "I have never asked you for anything else,
just vote against this bill, don't let the tort reform laws be changed at the
national level." That is a very, very potent message when you talk about
this amount of money.
Now there is nothing inherently wrong of course with making
campaign contributions; it is legal. Everybody does it to promote their
own self-interest. The law allows it. Why should not plaintiffs' lawyers
invest a portion of the income they derive from the system to keep the
goose laying the golden eggs? After all, that system has been very good
to the trial lawyers.
Forbes now publishes a list of the nation's twenty-five top earning
trial lawyers. In 1994, first place was occupied by Texas lawyer Joseph
Michael
Jamail, whose income for 1994 was listed at $90 million.'
Jordan, eat your heart out. The person who was twenty-fifth on the list
of trial lawyers came in at $4 million.27 Mr. Corboy and one of his
partners were on that list, but I will not get into those numbers; he can if
he wants to.2
I compared the top twenty-five lawyers on the income list with the top
fifty lawyers on this contribution list. You will be surprised by the results.
24. See id.; see also Norman B. Arnoff, The Securities Litigation Reform Act of

1995, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 1996, at 3.
25. See Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th

Cong. (1995); see also 142 CONG. REC. H4425 (daily ed. May 6, 1996) (veto message
from President Clinton).
26. See Brigid McMenamin, The Best-PaidLawyers,FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 145.

27. See id. at 168.
28. See id. at 162, 166 (listing Philip Corboy at number 10 and Thomas Demetrio
at number 17).
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The same people making the most amount of money are making the most
contributions.2 9 Mr. Lerach, for example, was number thirteen in the
top twenty-five earners at $10 million, 30 and he also gave $800,000 to
political candidates who oppose tort reform. 3 That is a pretty good
return on your investment.
Now there is nothing wrong with these lawyers taking advantage of
a system that promotes this sort of behavior. We have evolved a civil
justice system in this country that puts enormous incentives out there for
people to sue. Mr. Corboy and his colleagues would be derelict in their
duty to their clients, and themselves (and their college age children), if
they did not participate in this process. As long as Congress, state
legislatures, and the courts encourage redistribution of wealth through the
tort system and encourage juries to make legislative judgments by sending
messages to distant corporate treasuries regarding how hot to brew
coffee,32 how fast to deliver pizza,33 and how to paint a BMW,' then
these cases are going to be brought. If the juries continue to bring in
judgments based upon an out-of-town corporation's net worth, the punitive
damages and the judgments are going to remain big, and those will be the
incentives.
Statistics show that less than fifty percent of the tort system goes to
benefit the person who may have been victimized.35 The lion's share
goes to the plaintiffs' lawyers. 36 However, to be completely fair, the
plaintiffs' lawyers are not the only ones profiting from this system; there
are other beneficiaries. We have a cottage industry of professional expert
witnesses in this country-I guess "mansion industry" is perhaps a better
phrase-that would not exist if we did not have this tort system. There
are also law firms that defend these cases. My colleagues often tell me
to stop attempting to reform the civil justice system because we are all
29. See McMenamin, supra note 26, at 145; Spencer, supra note 8, at 60.
30. See McMenamin, supra note 26, at 165.
31. See id.
32. See McDonald's Settles Lawsuit over Burn from Coffee, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,

1994, at B6.
33. See Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 629 So. 2d. 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
34. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
35. See JAMES KAKAL

& NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN

TORT LITIGATION vii (1986) (noting that of the $29 to $36 billion in total expenditures
nationwide for tort litigation terminated in state and federal courts of general jurisdiction
in 1985, an estimated $16 to $19 billion was spent for various costs of the tort litigation
system, not including the net compensation paid to plaintiffs).
36. See id. at x fig.s.1.
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making a great deal of money. Most of the lawyers are benefitting from
this system. That is why, in my judgment, the American Bar Association
is so opposed to virtually any kind of meaningful tort reform.37 And let
us not forget the insurance companies, the in-house lawyers, and so forth.
I think of it as tithing. It is not contribution to get into heaven, but
a contribution to stay there. So you have to ask yourself, is it fair to
criticize trial lawyers for lawfully supporting a system that is good for
them and good for the country? Perhaps not, but criticism is warranted
if the system is, indeed, bad for the country.
Let me just say a few words about the system. Our tort system,
according to most estimates, costs our economy five times what it costs
Japan, Germany, or the United Kingdom. 38 The tort tax costs this
country an estimated $300 billion, although some people say $100 billion,
depending upon what you count.39 It is difficult to get exact numbers,
but we know the amount is huge. One can compare the numbers to the
Gross National Product (GNP) and see that, over the past twenty or thirty
years, the tort tax has grown at a much faster rate than the GNP.' For
example, punitive damages in Alabama from 1974 to 1978, which were
affirmed on appeal, were over $400,000.41 Jump ahead fifteen years,
and in a comparable four-year interval, the figure jumps to more than $90
million.42 Moreover, in Texas, between 1968 and 1971, business
punitive damage verdicts affirmed on appeal were $85,000. 43 Twenty
years later, that figure jumped to $127 million.'
I could go on about statistics, but let me give you a few more specific
examples. Take a look at Barbour County, Alabama. Almost eighty
percent of the tort cases filed in that county seek punitive damages.45
Moreover, in Alabama as a whole, punitive damages affirmed by the
37. See Martha Middleton, A ChangingLandscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 60
(quoting a representative of the ABA who called any federal litigation curtailing product
liability "an unwise and unnecessary intrusion of massive proportions").
38. See Leslie Spencer, The Tort Tax, FORBES, Feb. 17, 1992, at 40, 42.
39. See id. at 40-42 (discussing the direct and indirect costs of the tort system).
40. See id. at 40.
41. See Dr. Gore and Mr. Slick, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at A14 (noting
punitive damages of $409,385).
42. See id. (noting punitive damages of $90,366,527 for the years 1989-93).
43. See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, BMW of N. Am., Inc., v.
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896) (citing S. TURNER, WASHINGTON LEGAL
FOUND., PUNITIvE DANAGES EXPLOSION: FACT OR FICTION B-7 (1992)).
44. See id.
45. See George L. Priest, PunitiveDamagesReform: The Case ofAlabama, 56 LA.

L. REV. 825, 828 (1996).
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Supreme Court of Alabama from 1987 through the
first half of 1994
46
equalled $53.2 million-thirteen dollars per capita.
My submission is not that there is anything wrong with the trial bar
participating in the political process. Our system permits it to occur, and
if you like this system, then nothing should be done about it. However,
if you do not like the civil justice system that they are supporting, and the
polls tell us that up as much as seventy-five to eighty-five percent of the
people in this country want a change in the tort system,47 then you need
to change the current scheme. But, as long as the legislators are beholden
to those people who ask that one request, and who may have been the
largest contributor to their election, there will be no such change.
PHILIP CORBOY: Judge Becker missed something: he did not tell
you that I am a Democrat. That might be surprising since I come from
Cook County, Illinois. I am of that type of background where you are
born a Democrat, and even if you become wealthy enough to become a
Republican, you stay a Democrat.
There are people in our town who really believe that the following
discussion took place between college roommates who met each other long
after they got out of college. The more successful of the two, a
Republican, said to his pal, "Are you still a Democrat?"
"Of course I'm a Democrat," he replied.
"Why are you still a Democrat?"
He said, "Well, my father was a Democrat, my grandfather was a
Democrat, and my great-grandfather was a Democrat, and that's why I am
a Democrat."
"Well, that sounds silly. If your father was a horse thief, grandfather
was a horse thief, and your great-grandfather was a horse thief, would you
be a horse thief?"
He said, "Of course not, I'd be a Republican."
So whenever I get into a discussion like this, I love it if the other guy
tells me that I am greedy, an ambulance chaser, and a tassle-toed
squeezer. I have been called all of those. I started law school fifty years
ago this month, and I tried my first lawsuit on November 11, 1950. I
remember that because it was Armistice Day, and I did not have to go to
work, so I had another day to get ready for the trial.
I have been trying lawsuits ever since. I represent people who are
quadriplegic or blind, whose spouses are dead, whose fathers are dead,
and whose mothers are dead. Some of them are in vegetative states.
Every one of those people has recognized the contribution that I have
46. See id. at 829.
47. See Spencer Abraham& Mitch McConnell, The Next Steps in Real Tort Reform,
WASH. TIMEs, May 3, 1995, at A17.
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supplied to their wherewithal. I assure you, if there is anybody in this
room who loses a wife, loses a husband, loses a leg, loses an eye, or loses
a life, they are going to call me, or somebody like me, whether they are
a Republican or Democrat.
I have been antagonistic to the changes sought for the simple reason
that it would take away people's rights. The term "tort reform" is a
euphemism for tort "deform"; it is a euphemism for "pro-defendant
system."
There is not one area in the anticipated tort
legislation-national, local, or state-which in any way gives rights to
people. They all take rights away from people; they all diminish the right
to recover for pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, et cetera.
I got a telephone message as I was leaving the office the other day.
It was from a man named Mr. Nash. The call was about a USA Today
article he received in the mail.4 Here is what Mr. Nash said, "So
pleased to hear that Mr. Corboy is continuing the fight against caps in tort
reform. I am a former client who was badly burned and lost my wife.
If it weren't for Mr. Corboy, I don't know how I would have raised my
kids. Thank you." Believe me, I do not remember Mr. Nash.
It is difficult arguing with Mr. Olson. He is a decent man. It is
difficult because he is courteous; it is difficult because he is gentle. But,
the simple fact of the matter is he is wrong.
If you have a case, and I learned this from the first case I tried, that
is tough on the law, you talk about the facts. If you have a case that is
tough on the facts, you talk about the law. If you have a case that is
tough on the law and the facts, you talk about the other lawyer. Now, I
do not know why this is such an issue when it is conceded that lawyers of
all stripes, of all branches of our system, have contributed to the present
Administration. I assume that they had a lot of reasons to do it. It might
be a gender thing or an age thing. This is an age where there are an
awful lot of people shy of fifty who would like to see somebody shy of
fifty in the presidential office. But, whatever it is, the people that are
interested in tort reform are not Mom and Pop school-people. There are
several groups labeled "coalitions" that have tort reformers as their
primary members. One of them is the Manhattan Institution, 49 in which
Peter Huber,' who has a tremendous ability to persuade, is very
48. See Lawyer on the FrontLines in Battle over Tort Reform, USA

TODAY,

Dec.

12, 1995, at 2A.
49. See Lyle Denniston, In Attacking Lawyers, Bush and Quayle Enter CultureWar,
BALTIMORE SUN,

Sept. 6, 1992, at 51 (describing the Manhattan Institution for Policy

Research as a vocal critic of personal injury lawsuits).

50. For Peter Huber's participation in The Federalist Society Conference, see Peter
Huber, Whose Gore Is Stalked?, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 419 (1997).
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active.5
Its membership includes the Product Liability Coordinating
Policy Committee, which has a budget of $3 million a year for the tort
reform debate. It has the civil justice reform group and membership of
forty general counsel from the nation's largest corporations. One of its
greatest spokesmen is our speaker today, Mr. Olson. I am not so sure he
appreciates it, but Mr. Olson is defined by many articles and media people
as a lobbyist for the anti-tort people.52 There is also the American
Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, who are in the anti-tort business,
3
but I do not know why.1
Most lobbyists that I have met are very honest, very competent, and
very capable. Their job is to raise money for the people they represent
and to persuade legislators and sometimes members of the executive
branch. What I am suggesting is that these people represent Corporate
America, and Corporate America is organized money, and there is nothing
wrong with money being organized. There is nothing wrong with people,
whose pocketbooks might be affected, being anti-tort. However, that is
because they have never been hurt; as soon as they are hurt, they hire
people like me.
I have represented everybody in this world that you can think of, from
bank presidents to prostitutes, Catholic priests to Rabbis, executives to
state senators-you name it. I have represented everyone, college
professors, law professors, and doctors. However, I recently fired a
client-a Republican state senator. He came to me when he was hurt.
His case, a medical malpractice case, was against the medical school
where I attended law school, Loyola. I represented him because I
believed he was the victim of a tort.
On March 9, 1995, he and all of the other Republicans in our state
legislature passed-had the Governor sign-the most draconian tort reform
51. See Denniston, supra note 49 (describing Mr. Huber as a critic of challenges
to the tort system); see also PETER HUBER, GALLILEO'S REVENGE, JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991); PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS

CONSEQUENCES (1988); Peter Huber, A Preemptive Strike Against the Tort Bar, FORBES,
July 6, 1992, at 104; Peter Huber, MalpracticeLaw-A Defective Product,FORBES, Apr.
16, 1990, at 154.
52. See Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case'sLegal Buccaneers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1995, at D1; Marcia Coyle, New Jury Verdict Rolefor Courts, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1996,

at A22; Anthony Ramirez, Consumer CrusaderFeels a Chill in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES., Dec. 31, 1995, § 3, at 10.
53. See Accounts Change a Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at D6 (noting an
AICPA rule change which "could make it harder to sue accountants for wrongdoing").
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bill in the country.'M Name any diminution of plaintiff's rights, and we
have got it: a $500,000 cap on compensatory damages, a $250,000 cap on
punitive damages, joint civil liability gone, no product liability suits can
be filed without an expert's expert opinion that the product is faulty, and
a twelve-year statute repose. I hope that a year from now we can come
back and tell you that the law has been found unconstitutional. I am
certainly not sitting back and waiting; we are fighting it. So far, we have
won in three trial courts, and it will probably go before the supreme court
of our state very soon. Hopefully, then, it will become a federal problem
again; in the meantime, we are laboring under it.
This state senator also voted for tort reform in a way that was only
prospective. But, when he went for the bill, he did not make it at all
retroactive. He made sure he was protected and then took away from the
populace, from the citizenry, the opportunity to seek compensatory
damages. Future damages are limited to $500,000, but he stands to
receive $2 to $2.5 million if he wins his lawsuit.
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) showed that trial
lawyers gave $30 million in contributions in a five year period.5'
According to ATRA, my firm gave $200,000. Although that sounds like
a lot of money, it is over a five year period.56 We have thirty lawyers
in our firm, so that amounts to $500 per person, or $125 per year per
attorney. I cannot really say that this is going to sway the President of the
United States or even a state legislator.
Therefore, you are right. The ability and the responsibility of those
of us who believe that you are entitled to contribute, not to personal
coffers but to campaign funds, is certainly in direct relationship to how we
feel. There is a spokeswoman for Philip Morris who said that we give to
people who think the way we think. If this were not true, I certainly
would not have given any money at all to any legislator in the country.
I have even contributed to people I do not know, most of them Democrats.
However, two of them were not Democrats; one was a man named John
54. See H.B. 20, P.A. 89-7, 85th Gen. Assembly, 1995 Il. Legis. Serv. 224

(West). The Civil Justice Reform Amendments, which, in part, limit punitive damages
to three times economic damages, create $500,000 caps on noneconomic damages and
abolish joint liability when one or more defendants cannot pay a judgment. See id.
55. See 1995 ATRA REPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that "[b]etween January,
1989 and December, 1994, individual plaintiffs lawyer contributions reviewed to all
Congressional candidates totaled $18,066,433. .

.

. This figure, combined with ATLA

PAC receipts of $12,872,886 over the same period... comes to $30,939,319 in total
contributions from plaintiffs lawyers for Federal races.").
56. See id. at 4 (listing the "Top 50 Plaintiffs Lawyer Contributions," including
$199,600 from the law firm of Corboy & Demetrio of Illinois).
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Fox of Pennsylvania, and the other was Henry Hyde, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee.
In any event, there is a fellow named Bud Shuster of the Ninth
Congressional District of Pennsylvania, who in the last election received
contributions totalling $109,250 from 205 people." It does not sound like
much, only $532 per person, but ninety-three of those people came from
out of state. This is a man that is legislating in the state of Pennsylvania.
One of the people that contributed $2000 to his campaign is a fellow by
the name of Ted Olson, a lawyer from Washington, D.C." I do not
know how many Ted Olsons there are in Washington, D.C., but Bud
Shuster is an ardent tort reformer who has been a legislator for twentyfour years. He is on the Infrastructure and Transportation Committee, yet
he acquires money from all over the country from people who are
interested in his vote for tort reform.
Now, I do not suggest for one moment that there is anything wrong
with people supplying money to legislators who think the way they do.
It is an absolute cover-up. With luck, I will continue to contribute money
to Democrats for a long time.

III. REBUTTALS
MR. OLSON: Okay, it was me, but I did not contribute to Bud
Shuster because of the tort issue. I did so because he is a good friend of
mine.
We are, however, in agreement on one thing, that there is nothing
wrong with making political contributions to people who support the kind
of causes that you support. I am not advocating a change that would
prevent people from contributing to their political candidates.
I merely think that the American people need to know how much
power is being exercised by a relatively small number of people to
preserve the status quo, because contrary to what Mr. Corboy says, it is
not just big corporations that support tort reform.
In fact, big
corporations, although they try to get involved, are very ineffective at
contributing to political candidates because the officers of big corporations
have many legislative interests. Their interests are spread across the
57. See FederalElection Commission's Individual ContributionsReport, Aug. 2,
1996, at 1, availablein LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Memfin File. For the 1995-96 election
cycle, as of Aug. 2, 1996, Shuster's campaign received $451,876 from 664 listed
individuals, of which approximately 46%, or approximately 304 individuals, were from
outside Shuster's home state of Pennsylvania. See id. The total includes some
individuals who are listed twice, including two $1000 contributions from Theodore B.

Olson. See id.
58. See id.
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board from environmental issues, to labor issues, to taxes. The civil
justice system is just one small thing.
It is very difficult to raise any money from corporate executives
because they are not in the same income bracket as plaintiffs' lawyers;
they do not get their names listed in Forbes unless they are CEOs. The
important thing is that people across the country-and I have seen what I
regard as legitimate polls that say people that are liberal, conservative,
old, young, Democrats, Republicans, labor, management, stockholders
and so forth-are disturbed by the civil justice system.
I would hire Mr. Corboy too if I was injured. I would hire Mr.
Corboy to see how much I could get in the way of punitive damages if I
spilled a cup of coffee on myself, too. Why not? That is like a ticket to
the lottery.
Mr. Corboy operates from the presumption that this legislation is
taking away people's rights because it affects their ability to get large
punitive damages or one hundred percent liability from someone who is
one percent at fault, and that the system does not have any other victims.
The defendants in those cases are people, they have rights. The
stockholders have rights; they innocently invest in companies and wind up
paying the punitive damages. The municipalities that get sued for punitive
damages, and the taxpayers who pay those punitive damage awards and
excessive verdicts, have rights.
There is some room for improvement in the system to protect all of
the people in this country. If you focus on one victim in one case and say
he or she should get $70 million in order to punish the stockholders of that
company, who may be school teachers or retired persons who simply
invested in that corporation, it does not make any sense to me. My point
here is not to criticize the trial lawyers; my point is to make sure that the
people of this country know what the facts are, so that they can exercise
their judgment if they believe the tort system in this country does not
work.
The other problem not mentioned by Mr. Corboy is that our tort
system is causing it to become difficult to get certain types of products.
You do not see diving boards in municipal swimming pools anymore. It
is trivial, but I think it is symptomatic, that in New York they have taken
all of the jungle gyms out of the playgrounds because of tort claims.59
Connecticut municipalities are closing parks and bike trails because of the
liability crisis.' There are products that are used for implants, heart
valves, and other uses that are becoming less and less available because
59. See Douglas Martin, That Upside-Down High Will Be Only a Memory; Monkey
Bars Fall to Safety Pressures, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1996, at B1.
60. See Fred Musante, Liability Costs Curb Recreation, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22,
1996, § 13 (Conn.), at 1.
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of the tort crisis. One New York Times headline, in December 1995,
reflected the fact that most of the money for research in new birth control
methods is tied up because of the litigation frenzy associated with any kind
of birth control."
Mr. Corboy immediately segued from that into an attack upon the
people who oppose the tort system as it presently exists, instead of dealing
with the fact that many people, irrespective of their point of view, believe
that the tort system should be changed. The American people-something
like eighty-three percent according to a recent poll-believe that our
current tort system has major problems and needs serious improvement.62
That is clearly a system that needs correction, and if the people of this
country know who has the biggest stake in keeping it the way it is, it will
help them vote or put pressure on their legislators to change it.
MR. CORBOY: I am going to ask a rhetorical question. I hope I am
right. I do not know of any municipality in this country that can be sued
for punitive damages. Think about that and answer it yourself. I do not
know any state that can be sued for punitive damages. They are
immune. 63
Let us talk about the suggestion that punitive damages are a terrible
blight. Take a look at the law article in the Wall Street Journal, which is
not exactly a plaintiff's house organ, in which they found that punitive
damage awards to be modest and very rare.' Where did the study come
from? It was from the National Center for State Courts at Cornell
University.65 They came to the conclusion that punitive damages are a
very rare thing. The American Tort Reform Association and its siblings
and offspring, the Manhattan Institute, make the studies.
Right now there is a young fellow from my firm who is running for
the state legislature. The job pays $45,000 a year, so I do not know how
he is going to live. However, the Republican Party took a poll and
bragged afterwards that the people in that jurisdiction believed that a
Republican should be elected. The poll question was as follows: "Would
61. See Tamar Lewin, Fears, Suits and Regulations Stall ContraceptiveAdvances,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at Al.

62. See Abraham & McConnell, supra note 47.
63. See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary or Punitive
Damages From Municipal Corporation, 1 A.L.R. 448 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing
treatment in various jurisdictions and noting generally that "while courts have not favored

the recovery of punitive damages against a municipal corporation" the presence of a
statute expressly authorizing or denying recovery is a controlling factor).
64. See Edward Felsenthal, Punitive Awards Are Called Modest, Rare, WALL ST.
J., June 17, 1996, at B4.

65. See id.
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you vote for a clean-cut, nice young man whose father was a policeman
who just died and who has contributed much to the community, or would
you vote for an ambulance-chasing lawyer who works for one of the
largest law firms in Chicago, and who does nothing but take a third of the
clients' monies?"
Studies prove exactly what you want them to prove. Maybe the
statistic that I am about to tell you is wrong too, but it came from the
Center for Responsive Politics. It showed that the pro-tort reform political
action committees contributed $22 million to the United States Senate.
The American Trial Lawyers Association of America contributed
$930,000.66
Trial lawyers do a pretty good job for corporate America. They do
a wonderful job when they are representing organized money. For
example, they convinced juries in sixty-five percent of the malpractice
cases in Illinois that patients should not recover from doctors. 67
Corporate America has a pretty good thing, and it is suggesting that
jurors do not know what they are doing, judges do not know what they are
doing, appellate court judges do not know what they are doing, supreme
court judges do not know what they are doing-everyone is wrong.
Everybody is wrong except Corporate America. I looked at the stock
market this morning, which is pretty high. Corporate America is doing
pretty well, despite this tort system.
What is it that is in need of change? This need comes from Corporate
America's desire for more money. They want more money for their
shareholders and, therefore, for their executives. Now there is nothing
wrong with wanting more money, but the simple fact of the matter is that
there is nothing wrong with the tort system.
Every once in awhile, there is an aberrational result. Take the
McDonald's case for example.68 It is a perfect example of how the
system works. The woman was found twenty percent negligent, so they
66. See Center for Responsive Politics, Press Release, Liability Amendments Benefit
Health Care Industries 1 (May 2, 1995) (on file with the New York Law School Law
Review) (noting that over five years ATLA contributed $930,750 to Senate candidates,
while interests that "would gain if amendments to the products liability bill" became law,

including health care professions, institutions, service providers and pharmaceutical and
medical device manufacturers contributed more than $11,540,688 over the same period).
67. See 1995 Calendar Year Summary and Index of Malpractice Trials, COOK
COUNTY JURY VERDICT REP. (1996) (on file with the New York Law SchoolLaw Review)

(noting a defendant winning percentage of 67.3 % for physicians and hospitals).
68. See Diana Griego Erwin, Life is Not Without Risks, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 29,
1994, at 6.
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cut her verdict twenty percent immediately. 9 That is a pretty good
system. Why? Because she had a cup of coffee between her legs, and she
opened the cup of coffee and the scalding coffee burned her." I wonder
if you would suggest that third degree burns over a seventy-nine year old
woman's thighs was a lottery. I do not know how much you would pay
for that, but I certainly would not pay one dollar, $250,000, $500,000 or
$2 million. The court cut the punitive damages to $480,000 and then
Corporate America settled the case." Now, they did not settle the case
because they thought they were going to win on appeal. Additionally, the
suit did not put McDonald's out of business; they have served another
billion and a half hamburgers since then. So I respectfully suggest there
is nothing wrong with the system that a little bit more understanding could
not help.
I assure you again that if somebody in this room is hurt, they will go
to Barry Nace,1 and Barry Nace would do exactly what I would do for
you: try to get you the most money that you are entitled to. When I say,
"most money," that is a pejorative term. What I mean is to get what you
are entitled to for your injuries, no more and no less, without the
interference of the federal government telling you what you should do in
your state.
IV. AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
JUDGE BECKER: I told you that you were in for a treat, and I was
right. We will open the floor for questions to either or both of our
debaters.
QUESTION: Should these questions not be properly left to the state
legislatures rather than the federal government?
MR. CORBOY: Well, I am a Madisonian Federalist. I believe we
should have a federal government, but one that keeps its hands off of the
states' rights. Yes, I come from a state right now where, as soon as the
Republican legislature was taken away by the electorate and the Chief
Executive Office of our state was given to the Republicans, a tort system
69. See Robert A. Clifford, Justice System Correctsits Outrages, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
29, 1994, at 24; McDonald's Makes Out-of-Court Settlement in Hot-Coffee Case, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 2, 1994, at B1.

70. See Erwin, supra note 68, at 6.
71. See Clifford, supra note 69, at 24.
72. Mr. Barry Nace is a well known plaintiffs' attorney and former president of the
American Trial Lawyers Association of America. See Barry Nace, Science and Civil
Justice:A Recent Oxymoron, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 393 (1997)
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was implemented that is going to change the mores of our community.
They believe that the laws of Illinois, even though they are draconian, are
what the people in Illinois want. I do not have any idea what the laws in
Alabama are, although I would like to have some cases down there. I
have no idea what the laws of Texas are, although I just had a case in
Texas. The tort system is indigenous to the state in which the tort either
takes place or, because of venue laws, where a defendant can be sued.
The Republican legislators in the federal government want to
federalize the tort system, but they do not want to make a federal question
out of it. 3 You know, if you are not given the right to go to the federal
court, cases will stay in the state courts but they will be saddled with
federal law. Now, I do not know what the federal government's purpose
is in having a federalization and still have the litigation remain in the state.
MR. OLSON: One good thing that has come from this debate over
federal legislation to correct the excesses of certain aspects of the tort
system is that we have discovered a whole new class of people that were
never historically Federalists but all of a sudden have found states rights.
The plaintiffs' trial bar is now a lot more interested in states rights. I
think that it is important to understand, for example, that out of state
corporations are regularly being punished in Alabama for doing business
there. The former Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court put
it well when he said, "I sleep well at night when I am able to redistribute
money from an out of state corporate treasury to the citizens of my state
who vote in my election."'
What we have in the excesses of the tort system are efforts by one
state to control its own products and how things are done in the state,
distorted by what is happening someplace else. In the Supreme Court
decision this last term involving BMW,7' the state of Alabama had
decided to punish BMW because it sold cars under certain legal standards
that were enacted by other states. Essentially, Alabama was attempting
73. See Neil A. Lewis, House G.O.P. Quits Tort Reform Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

7, 1996, at Al (calling the plan "a sweeping overhaul of the nation's civil litigation

system" and noting that it would, for the first time, set nationwide standards "in both
state and Federal courts").

74. See Quotes, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 26. West Virginia Supreme Court of

Appeals Justice Richard Neely was quoted: "As long as I am allowed to redistribute

wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so.

Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else's money away, but so is my
job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families and their friends will re-elect

me." Id.
75. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
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to punish BMW for perfectly lawful conduct elsewhere.76 The framers
of our Constitution expected Congress to regulate interstate commerce to
prevent the states from using their power to abuse and discriminate in just
this manner.
QUESTION: I am addressing this to Mr. Corboy. I teach law at
George Mason and will give you a hypothetical question. A client comes
to you who has a case in which you estimate that the injuries would be
worth $25 million if you could get a jury verdict. However, also based
on your experience and your associates' research, you believe there is
only a ten percent chance of winning-a very weak case-but, on the other
hand, you are a very experienced trial lawyer with great rhetorical skills.
You might be able to persuade the jury. With only a ten percent chance
of winning, the economic value of the case is $2.5 million, and your cut
is at least $800,000 or maybe a little less after expenses. My question is:
do you take this case and, if so, do we have a sound court system
involving "loser pays" rules that would encourage attorneys to take cases
with high economic values that are essentially speculative?
MR. CORBOY: Sure I would take the case. There is a person that
has been injured and there is a viable defendant, whether vicariously or
with money in its bank, who has to respond to the judicial system.
Ninety-six percent of the cases in this country are settled,77 and my guess
is that this case would be one of them. However, if it were settled in my
office, we would not charge $800,000. It is that simple.
Most lawyers I think, at least the ones I have come in contact with,
have the responsibility of making sure that equity results. I have had
exactly one case in my life that was settled for $25 million, and the fee
was not one-third of $25 million, believe me. The lawyers that I know
would certainly reduce the fee commensurate with what they believed an
equitable percentage would be. My guess is they would charge one-half
of one-third or, perhaps, twenty percent.
The reference to "loser pays" is a hot idea today, but it is dead in
Florida.78 Florida tried it, but insurance companies found that, when
76. See id. at 1593.
77. See Jack Marshall, The Lawyer's Role in the Structured Settlement Era:Duties,
Rules, and Perils, 43 FEDLAW 10 (1996) (noting that "[a]ttorneys deal in settlements; 95
percent of all cases are settled").
78. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 1996) (providing for an award of attorney
fees only when "[t]he court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue

of either law or fact raised by the losing party"); see also Phillip H. Snaith, Attorney's
Fees Under FloridaStatute 5Z105: Caselaw Development, 10 NOVA L. REv. 156, 173

(1985) (noting that the primary purpose for the statute was to deter unfounded litigation;
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they won a lawsuit, they were unable to collect the legal fees back from
the plaintiff. Most plaintiffs cannot afford their own lawyer, let alone pay
the expenses of the insurance company's lawyer. On the other hand,
when the plaintiff won the insurance companies had to pay the plaintiff's
legal fees, so "loser pays" died. The legislation was taken off the books
the next session. "Loser pays" does not work because plaintiffs do not
have the money to pay when they lose.
MR. OLSON: I want to respond to something that Mr. Corboy said
earlier about punitive damages against municipalities. The fact is that,
unless I am mistaken, in most jurisdictions you can recover punitive
damages from municipalities. The case that stands out most in my mind
involved East St. Louis, Illinois, where an individual was drunk, put in
the jail, and then injured by fellow prisoners. He won a large punitive
damage verdict.
JUDGE BECKER: Why are plaintiffs' fee arrangements not disclosed
to jurors and what would be the effect if you unbundled the fee from the
award?
MR. OLSON: I suppose the plaintiffs' lawyers would say you should
also disclose the defense lawyer's arrangements for his fees. What would
happen if you unbundled and allowed the recovery of attorney's fees in
these cases? I do not know what the effect would be. I suspect that it
would result in smaller attorney's fees. I do not know what a jury is
thinking when it awards the kind of verdicts that Mr. Corboy has been
successful in recovering.
MR. CORBOY: It certainly would not be one-sided. I see no
relevancy in suggesting that the jury should know that my opponent is
getting $500 an hour. This is not a proper way to prejudice the jury. It
is a function of all lawyers to prejudice the jury in their favor. Let us use
whatever word we want, but that is our function. However, there are
rules that you must follow. Judges do not allow you to improperly
prejudice the jury, but it would seem to me that disclosing the amount of
the fee would be discourteous to a defendant, and I say that in a very mild
fashion.
If the plaintiff was entitled to a $100,000 recovery, and a twenty-five
percent rule applied that was disclosed to the jury, they may add twentyfive percent to the $100,000. It does not seem right for the plaintiff or the
defendant to characterize the fees of the lawyer as being too much, and
however, "since it has itself presented such fertile ground for litigation, it has not yet
achieved this end").
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then assert that since the defendant can afford $500 or $100 an hour, he
should receive more than he is entitled. I do not think it is a relevant
inquiry of the jury.
QUESTION: Would that experiment in Florida have been more
successful if the plaintiff and the plaintiffs lawyer were jointly and
severally liable for the attorney's fee award.
Why
MR. CORBOY: What about the defendant's lawyer?
discriminate against the plaintiff's lawyer? "Loser pays" means the loser
pays. Why should not the defense lawyer, if your logic has any validity,
also be responsible on a fee basis? I do not see the relevancy.
Incidentally, ninety-six percent of the cases are settled. We are talking
about four percent of the cases in which shifting of fees may be a potent
way of settling more cases.
MR. OLSON: The figures that I was using excluded wrongful death
cases.7 9 Alabama is the only state in the United States that uses punitive
damages as the method of recovery in wrongful death cases,' ° but we
took those cases out of the figures.
I have a chart that shows punitive damage awards affirmed on appeal
over a seven-year period, 1987 to 1993, in Georgia, Mississippi,
Tennessee and Alabama. The total amount in that period was $7 million
in Georgia, $3 million in Mississippi, $5 million in Tennessee, and $101
million in Alabama."1 I suspect that if there is a possibility for a plaintiff
to bring the lawsuit in any one of the four states, the plaintiff would be
crazy not to bring the case in Alabama. This is probably why the BMW
cases82 were being brought in Alabama and not in the neighboring states.
Again, as far as the settlement figure, it is very difficult to get
empirical data. I am sure that in Barbour County, Alabama,' where
practically everybody has either been a punitive damage plaintiff or is
related to someone who has been, and where fifty-two percent of the cases
brought are by the same law firm, the immense jury awards affect a
settlement in every single case.

79. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.

80. See

ALA. CODE

§ 6-11-20 (1996) (limiting punitive damages in civil cases to

wrongful death tort actions).

81. See Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 714 app. A (Ala.
1996).

82. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
83. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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MR. CORBOY: The potential for recovery stimulates a settlement
somewhere in the range of ten or fifteen percent of the time if the lawyer
knows what he is doing. If the lawyer does not know what he is doing,
the case is going to go to trial, and they are going to lose or have a ninety
percent chance of losing. Obviously, the settlement climate or the jury
verdict climate has something to do with the amount of settlements in any
jurisdiction.

